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INTRODUCTION
The packaging industry is very diverse and 
makes use of a large variety of materials for 
packaging and substances/materials/items to be 
packaged. The industry stores materials, mixtures, 
and products in small and in large quantities and 
units. There is also a range of processes involved as 
shaping, filling, painting, and finishing. Altogether, 
the industry handles, stores, and processes a host of 
combustible materials; there are numerous ignition 
sources around and even, albeit in smaller quanti-
ties, toxic materials. There is therefore a chance of 
mishap with disastrous consequences given a situ-
ation of sizable quantity of material/substance with 
hazardous properties.
Scale enlargement of operations leads to large 
quantities. Space is scarce, competition severe, time 
is costly, and hence safety is under pressure. Several 
accidents around the world with disastrous results 
show that such an event means a risk for the conti-
nuity of the company or puts the company at least 
under a severe financial threat. On the other hand, 
experience shows too that a good safety attitude 
instigated from the top pursuing thorough hazard 
identification, and investing in risk controls by pre-
ventive and protective measures, hence performing 
risk assessment, increases productivity and worker 
 
 
motivation, and lowers the frequencies and costs of 
mishaps. Workers are feeling more secure, safety 
culture is fostered, and insurance charges are being 
lowered. 
EXAMPLES OF MISHAPS
Two examples of disastrous mishaps will be 
briefly considered. The first is of a company in 
the Netherlands burned down and going bankrupt, 
namely Chemie-Pack at Moerdijk in 2011. About 
the event an extensive report by the Dutch Accident 
Investigation Board (OVV) has been published [1]
Fig. 1. Fire at Chemie-Pack, Moerdijk, the Neth-
erlands, January 2009 (Foto:Micha Okkerman/
Twitter).
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The company with a workforce of 50 had activi-
ties of repacking chemicals going on at the present 
location since 1982. On the rectangular premises 
were several sheds, storage buildings, and an office 
along the fence periphery, all connected with the 
entrance via a courtyard. The facility was licensed 
according to the Seveso Directive. At the day of the 
fire with an outside temperature of, at maximum, 3 
to 4 oC, several orders were being worked on. Due 
to the high activity, level stores were overfilled and 
although violating their license, the courtyard con-
tained a variety of stored flammables such as xylene 
and other raw materials for plastics, packed in a few 
hundred 1m3 IBC’s (intermediate bulk containers) 
and 200 litre steel drums. One activity was pumping 
resin components and mixing them. The mixing 
was under a roof, but the pump was outside and was 
cleaned before the operation with xylene of which 
some was spilled. As due to the low temperature the 
pump ceased working, it was heated with a handheld 
propane burner. The xylene underneath acciden-
tally ignited; a powder fire extinguisher brought in 
appeared not to function. Meanwhile the resin pump 
kept on running while the heated exit line broke and 
resin spilled. The crew then tried to extinguish the 
fire with a water jet worsening the situation drasti-
cally. One of the IBCs caught fire (see [2] for behav-
iour of an IBC in fire) upon which the event esca-
lated quickly. The local fire brigade rushed in but 
was overwhelmed by the conflagration and called 
in regional forces. An enormous, many kilometres 
long black cloud started passing over large cities 
causing much anxiety in the population. Prepared-
ness for such an event appeared to be low, leadership 
and coordination failed, and crisis teams on local 
and regional policy levels were informed too late. 
The firewater polluted agricultural grounds causing 
tens of millions of damage. Inspection of the plant 
had occurred over the years after pre-announce-
ment. This way, work not allowed by the license, 
was not noted. Personnel were badly trained. Over 
the years management obtained advice on fire safety 
measures, but follow-up was inadequate. The whole 
is a typical example of a lack of safety manage-ment 
and bad safety culture. The event aroused much par-
liamentary and government response.
The second example is an American one 
reported by the Chemical Safety and Hazard Inves-
tigation Board [3]. This concerns a vapour cloud 
explosion inside a small facility caused by an over-
night release from a solvent tank for preparing ink 
for ink products. The explosion in the middle of night 
caused 10 people injured, 24 houses, and 6 busi-
nesses destroyed, Fig. 2. The facility was operated
Fig. 2. Left. Disastrous result of vapour cloud 
explosion inside an ink products plant near Boston, 
USA [3]. Right. Mixing tank with flammable solvent 
steam heated to 32 oC [3].
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by two companies, CAI Inc. (20 employees) and 
Arnel Inc. (9 employees) which before 1985 formed 
one entity. The plant stored thousands of litres of 
solvents and 25 tons of industrial nitrocellulose 
pellets (most of which in a trailer adjacent to the 
building). The 7500 litres solvent tank filled with 
volatile flammable liquid was steam heated to 32 oC 
to dissolve resin. At the end of a normal workday in 
November 2006, the production manager left leaving 
the stirrer on and believed to have closed the steam 
supply. Half an hour later the last employee switched 
off ventilation fans (exhaust and fresh air supply) 
and locked the building. At 2:46 in the morning 
alarm went off at the local fire brigade 1.5 km away; 
few seconds later the firemen experienced the blast. 
Several organizations contributed to the emergency 
response. The fire brigade was not made aware of 
the hazardous materials present. A complication 
arose when pipework of a LPG tank of a neighbour-
ing bakery started leaking (domino effect). In the 
middle of the night, 300 people had to be evacuated, 
and the fire burned for 17 hours. Management had 
not conducted a process hazard analysis; volatile 
flammables were stored inside the building with no 
detectors and alarm provisions or adequate ventila-
tion. Written procedures or checklists did not exist. 
Again, this is an example of a lack of safety man-
agement, training, emergency response, and a poor 
safety culture.
HAZARDS, DANGER, SAFETY, 
SECURITY AND RISKS
English is a language that makes a distinction 
between hazard and danger and between safety and 
security. Many other languages do not. Hazard is 
an inherent capability (energy, material/substance 
property, activity) for harm or damage by an effect 
to something exposed that is valued; danger is a haz-
ardous situation prone to result in harm or damage. 
Safety is a state of being protected against harm and 
other consequences of failure, while security is con-
cerned with being protected, for instance, against ter-
rorist or other criminal acts. Safety can be inherent 
in the absence of hazards; it can be engineered by 
applying measures, and it can be procedural by 
developing and implementing rules. Much the same 
can be said of security. In Figure 3 the elements are 
illustrated: a trigger unleashes the hazard potential 
in case the preventive barrier ceases due to a chain 
of causes.
A distinction should be made between process 
safety and personal safety, although the two are 
linked. Personal safety concerns the slips, trips, falls, 
and the like. By Occupational Safety and Health 
regulation, the EU Machine Directive, training and 
personal protection equipment (PPE) over the years 
much improvement has been seen. Process safety is 
concerned with high impact, low probability events. 
It is more treacherous as it usually seems to occur 
without warning and for those involved unknown. 
For many years a process can run without a problem 
and yet suddenly disaster strikes. Process safety 
deserves enhanced attention.
Risk is defined in ISO 31000, Risk management 
principles and guidelines, as the effect of uncer-
tainty on objectives. In other words, absolute safety 
as objective means absence of risks, but as there are 
always risks around, safety is never perfect. Safety 
Fig. 3. Illustration of elements of a hazard 
scenario for an exposed receptor; LOP is layer of 
protection [4].
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cannot be quantified, but risk can. Risk components 
are possible consequence/effect severity and likeli-
hood/probability, which both can be quantified but 
remain subject to uncertainty, consequence less than 
likelihood. Uncertainty will reduce when our knowl-
edge level increases.
RISK ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
General
Risk analysis consists of a systematic search for 
what can go wrong, what likelihood this will have, 
and how severe consequences will be. In assessment 
one asks whether the established risks are accept-
able, or at least tolerable, and if not what can be done 
to reduce them to a tolerable level. Hence, it is trying 
to answer the question “how safe is safe enough?” in 
a predictive sense.
A risk assessment, whether it is on safety, on 
success of a project or of an investment must always 
start with establishing context, of goal, stakeholders, 
and key elements. Then, follows identification of the 
risks via scenarios as shown in Figure 3: hazards, 
triggers, possible effects, exposed target vulnerabil-
ity. Next is determination of consequences followed 
by that of likelihoods. The latter are the most dif-
ficult to determine. In fact, probability and thus 
uncertainty comes in at all key elements, as neither 
consequences nor the chance of occurrence can be 
determined accurately due to many possible influ-
encing conditions, and lack of insight and knowl-
edge. Nevertheless it pays to make estimates, deter-
mine a relative order by risk magnitude and distrib-
ute available resources for preventive and protective 
risk reducing measures such that an optimum risk 
level will be obtained.
Qualitative methods
A first approach to obtain an overview of risks 
threatening your operations would be to derive a 
qualitative risk matrix as shown in Figure 4. It is a 
matter of making a hazard inventory of quantities 
of hazardous substances present, estimate effects 
in case an unintentional release will take place by 
a sudden rupture of a container, a large leak occur-
ring during a limited time, say 10 minutes, or a small 
leak over an indefinitely long time. Given a leak the 
property of the spilled material is important: vola-
tility, flammability, toxicity, oxidizing property, or 
corrosiveness. Further, risks shall be considered due 
to unintentional release of a large amount of poten-
tial energy such as large mass falling, bursting of 
container with compressed gas, et cetera. 
Although for identification a host of methods 
is available, two are really important: Hazard and 
Operability study (HAZOP) and Failure Mode and 
Effect Analysis (FMEA). Both HAZOP and FMEA 
should be carried out by a team led by an experi-
enced chairman. In HAZOP a team performs a sys-
tematic analysis of the effect of deviations from 
design intent (+, - or not); HAZOPs are conducted 
worldwide. FMEA partly overlaps HAZOP but con-
tributes. Because of the required effort, research 
is going on to increase productivity by a system 
approach and use of computing power. Human, 
management, and organizational failure are the most 
difficult causes to predict.
Semi-quantitative and quantitative risk 
assessments (QRA)
In a semi-quantitative approach severity of an 
Fig. 4. Qualitative risk matrix with example risk 
dots and indicated urgency of risk reduction action 
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event and probability of its occurrence are esti-
mated in orders of magnitude and may be plotted in 
a risk matrix as in Figure 4 but then with logarith-
mic scales and units of factors of 10. Consequence 
severity may be expressed in monetary units. For 
predicting severity one has to apply physical models 
of heating, collapse, rupture, fracturing, outflow, 
evaporation, dispersion, ignition, explosion, fire, and 
toxic concentration. Probability is considered over a 
certain period usually a year and is called frequency. 
In a risk matrix frequency ranges usually from an 
event once in ten to once in ten million years (10-1 
to 10-7/yr).
Fully quantitative methods must generate 
detailed scenarios with cascading and escalating 
effects. It will include so-called domino effects of 
one unit to another, and incompatibility between 
stored substances in case of fire. Such analyses are 
effort intensive and always lack data. The main 
value, however, is the brainstorming in a team and 
the thinking about cost effective risk reduction.
Limitations
Uncertainty and unknowns limit the confidence 
one can have in risk assessments. One or two factors 
of ten uncertainty range is not unusual. Accidents 
not having been predicted by an assessment are 
plenty. Yet, a systematic approach is key to attain 
control on risks.  
PREVENTIVE AND PROTECTIVE 
MEASURES
Leadership, management, organizational 
measures
As in many things in life but certainly in safety 
the attitude of leadership in a company is crucial. 
There may be many safety paraphernalia such as 
signs “Safety first”, but when a CEO does not care 
or is perceived not to care about safety, accidents are 
bound to happen. Analysis of many accidents has 
over and over again shown that behind the direct and 
intermediate causes there are root causes that for a 
very high proportion are management failures.
Very helpful and accepted in many companies 
is a safety management system (SMS). EU Seveso 
Directive 3 requires it for ‘establishments’ that fall 
within its scope of controlling major hazards, but 
it may be as well useful for companies exhibiting 
smaller risks. An SMS has many similarities with 
a quality management system and implementing 
it can also mean higher quality and effectiveness, 
hence higher productivity. A SMS contains require-
ments with respect to roles and responsibilities of 
employees, identification and evaluation of hazards, 
training/retraining, operational control and proce-
dures, management of change, emergency planning, 
performance monitoring with indicators, auditing 
and reviewing, and corrective organizational mech-
anisms.
Today, also the safety culture and measuring it 
via safety climate surveys is given much weight. 
Bowtie thinking
The bowtie developed from the late 1970s 
onwards but the concept really spread in 2000 and 
later. The name derives from the gentleman’s tie as 
two triangles pointing to each other. Left triangle is 
a fault tree showing cause-consequence chains with 
OR and AND gates and the right triangle an event 
tree of possible events developing and branching out 
after a critical or initiating event following occurring 
failure causes, see Figure 5. The bowtie appeared to 
be an excellent concept to obtain an overview where 
preventing (left) and protecting (right) barriers are 
useful or already present. Each branch from left to 
the far right forms a scenario.
Although the bowtie originally was thought of 
being composed of two technical quantitative risk 
analysis tools: a fault tree with its top event being the 
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initiating event of an event tree, it can well be used 
qualitatively to discuss risks and prevention and pro-
tection measures. In that case, the hazard is often 
symbolized by a rectangular box above the critical 
event (CE) with an arrow down to it to show how 
activating the CE unleashes the hazard potential, as 
shown in Figure 3. 
Properties of materials, physical measures: 
explosion and fire protection
Material data sheets contain many properties. 
Test methods are available. Measures are possible to 
reduce risk of explosion and fire, the most common 
threats in the packaging industry, although fire 
causes toxics. Sources of knowledge are plenti-
ful. Practical sources that can be consulted for free 
are FM Global Data sheets: https://www.fmglobal.
com/fmglobalregistration/. Lower flammable limits 
of most hydrocarbons are around 2 vol. % in air. 
Ignition can occur by a myriad of source types. An 
important principle is compartmentalization to avert 
explosion and block fire progress.
Regulatory: protection of workers, popula-
tion, environment
Company operators as they are called in EU 
Directives have a responsibility for occupational 
safety and health of workers and for the safety of res-
idents with regard to major hazards resulting from 
operations on their premises. Two of these regula-
tions concerned with preventing and protecting for 
gas and dust explosion effects shall be mentioned 
here as important for the branch: ATEX 95 and 137 
directives (Atmosphères Explosibles). The first is 
with respect to equipment not forming an ignition 
source in various degrees of protection depend-
ing on its location as prescribed by ATEX 137. The 
latter is requiring a risk assessment, e.g., resulting 
in an area classification in three hazard zones 0, 1, 
and 2 for gases and 20, 21, and 22 for combustible 
dusts, meaning for 0 and 20 permanently, for longer 
duration or frequently explosive (US: flammable) 
Fig. 5. Generic bowtie as it was applied in the EU ARAMIS risk assessment improvement project in the early 
2000 era led by INERIS in France [5].
LEGEND 
UE = Undesired Event, e.g., human act
CU E = Current Event condition, direct cause
IE = Intermediate Event, e.g., pump fails
CE = Critical Release Event, 12 types: leak, start of fire, etc.
SCE = Secondary CE, escalation
DP = Dangerous Phenomena, 13 types: Vapour, cloud 
explosion, pool fire, jet fire, etc. 
ME = Major Event, 4 types: overpressure, heat radiation, 
toxic load, and missiles.  
Barriers left of CE are Preventative (or Pro-active), and right 
Protective or Mitigative (also called Reactive).
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atmosphere present, for 1 and 21 likely to be present 
occasionally and for 2 and 22 not likely and of short 
duration. With these safety regulations Europe is in 
the preventative forefront witnessing disasters else-
where.
Another European achievement pertains to the 
risk acceptance criteria. The most known one that 
captures most of the following elsewhere is the UK 
HSE’s ALARP: As Low As Reasonably Practica-
ble. It has a certain development history. First is the 
distinction of three risk levels: Unacceptable, Toler-
able and Acceptable. As a minimum, risk must be 
lowered to become tolerable, but then further reduc-
tion must be realized till costs become unreasonably 
higher than the benefits. This required more detailed 
ruling, which took time to develop.
Emergency planning
Various parties are involved: company respond-
ers, community fire brigade, medical personnel, 
and police (for investigation of cause and providing 
quick access to the site). A risk assessment is a good 
basis for planning but is not enough. From the many 
scenarios a selection must be made and in a team a 
scenario analysis conducted to think through details 
and familiarize all parties with the situation. Period-
ically training, alarming, testing of equipment and 
teamwork is a must, in particular to train company 
and community emergency responders in effective 
cooperation together. 
CONCLUSIONS
Risk assessment and management pays. Their 
methods may have many weaknesses, but they 
compel us to think about and characterize hazards 
and analyse risks. By reducing likelihood and 
effects, and therefore costs of mishaps, they can 
prevent much misery. Methodical improvements are 
underway as discussed and exemplified in [4]. Their 
application assumes good knowledge of hazardous 
properties of substances together with imagination 
and data for scenario building.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I am grateful to Dr William J. Rogers, my Texan 
sparring partner on risk analysis, Bayesian statis-
tics and system approach, to provide his continuing 
support.
REFERENCES
[1] Onderzoeksraad voor de Veiligheid. 
Brand bij Chemie-Pack, 5 januari 2011, 
M2011CH0105 & IBN0105-07, Den Haag, 
februari 2012, www.onderzoeksraad.nl.
[2] Health and Safety Laboratory for Health and 
Safety Executive 2007, Fire performance of 
composite IBCs, Research Report RR564, © 
Crown Copyright 2007, UK.
[3] U.S. Chemical and Hazard Investigation 
Board, Investigation Report, Confined 
Vapor Cloud Explosion, CAI, Inc. and Arnel 
Company Inc., Danvers, MA, Nov.22, 2006, 
Report No. 2007-03-I-MA, May 2008.
[4] Pasman H.J., 2015. Risk Analysis and 
Control for Industrial Processes - Gas, Oil 
and Chemicals, A System Perspective for 
Assessing and Avoiding Low-Probability, 
High- Consequence Events, Butterworth 
Heinemann, Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Inc., 
2015, ISBN: 978-0-12-800057-1. 
[5] De Dianous V. and Fiévez C., ARAMIS 
project: A more explicit demonstration 
of risk control through the use of bow–
tie diagrams and the evaluation of safety 
barrier performance. Journal of Hazardous 
Materials, 130 (2006) 220–233.
